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What's Next

You just proved Pillar 1 - Sandbox Policies end-to-end. Here's how Pillars 2 and 3 fit in.

Roadmap content

The CLI surface for audit and MCP governance is still landing on sbx. The descriptions below explain the model and point to where each pillar lives today. Validate against your installed version as features ship.


Pillar 2 - MCP Tool Governance

MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers give agents access to tools - GitHub, Notion, your internal APIs, custom servers your team builds. Each tool is a new attack surface.

Docker AI Governance lets org admins define:

  • Which MCP servers are approved for agents in your org
  • Which tools within each server are usable
  • Which catalogs developers can pull from (curated Hub catalog vs. open public sources)
  • How secrets are injected per request, never persisted on the agent

This is the MCP Gateway Enterprise layer. It sits between agent and tool, evaluating every call against the same policy engine that enforces sandbox network rules in the Network demo.

Where to see it today: The MCP Gateway Enterprise control plane is rolling out. Check docker.com/products/ai-governance for current availability and your org's enablement status.


Pillar 3 - Audit and Visibility

Every policy decision - allow or deny, network or filesystem or MCP - generates a structured audit event. Conceptually:

{
  "timestamp": "2026-06-01T01:35:22Z",
  "user": "ajeetraina777",
  "org": "<your-org>",
  "sandbox_id": "sbx_abc123",
  "rule_type": "network",
  "rule_name": "deny exfiltration",
  "decision": "deny",
  "resource": "paste.ee:443",
  "agent": "shell"
}

These events stream to your existing SIEM (Splunk, Datadog, Elastic, Sentinel) for retention, alerting, and compliance reporting.

Where to see it today:

  • Admin Console - for your org, the Activity / Audit logs view shows org-level policy and access events (when enabled for your plan)
  • Local daemon log - runtime decisions on this machine are streamed to the sbx daemon log. For ad-hoc inspection during demos:
tail -50 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.docker.sandboxes/sandboxes/sandboxd/daemon.log

This is not a polished audit surface - it's the raw daemon log. But after running the Network and Filesystem enforcement tests, you can grep it for the paste.ee, example.com, and credential-access denials to see the underlying machinery in action:

grep -iE "paste\.ee|example\.com|deny|block" ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.docker.sandboxes/sandboxes/sandboxd/daemon.log | tail -20

A dedicated sbx audit CLI with structured query, export, and SIEM integration is on the roadmap. The Observability section walks through the structured JSONL surface and a live dashboard built on top of it.


The complete three-pillar picture

Pillar What it controls Where it's enforced Where to see it today
1. Sandbox policies Network, filesystem, resource limits Network proxy, mount layer Validated in Network + Filesystem demos
2. MCP tool governance Which tools agents can call MCP Gateway Enterprise Admin Console (rolling out)
3. Audit + visibility Every policy decision logged Audit event stream → SIEM Admin Console + daemon log

All three share one policy engine and one source of truth - the Admin Console for your org.


Where to go from here

  • Product page: docker.com/products/ai-governance
  • Docker docs: docs.docker.com - check for the latest AI governance documentation
  • The accompanying deck covers the policy framework and supporting architecture in more depth
  • Interactive Labspace: github.com/ajeetraina/labspace-ai-governance - the click-to-run version of this lab with built-in terminals and a live audit dashboard
  • Sandbox Kits - the next track in this lab shows how to package reproducible, shareable sandbox configurations

Quick recap

You proved:

  • Policies defined once in the Admin Console flow automatically to every developer's sbx
  • Three rules - two allows and one deny - enforce a real security model
  • The default-deny posture catches anything you didn't explicitly approve
  • Developers can't override the policies locally - the CISO retains control

That's the working version of "AI governance" you can defend to a security team.