Skip to content

Prove the Isolation

An agent on your Pi could reach your SSH keys, and also the hardware wired to the GPIO header. Check that the sandbox can reach neither.

Your home directory

sbx exec pi-lab ls -la $HOME
sbx exec pi-lab ls $HOME/.ssh $HOME/.claude

Real output:

drwxr-xr-t 3 root  root  4096 Nov 22 10:52 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root  root  4096 Nov 22 10:52 ..
drwxr-xr-t 4 agent agent 4096 Nov 22 10:52 Projects

ls: cannot access '/home/ajeetraina/.ssh': No such file or directory
ls: cannot access '/home/ajeetraina/.claude': No such file or directory

The path exists only to hold the workspace mount. Nothing else from your home is there.

The user

sbx exec pi-lab id

Real output:

uid=1000(agent) gid=1000(agent) groups=1000(agent),27(sudo),999(docker)

The agent can be powerful inside its VM without being you on the Pi.

Pi hardware

sbx exec pi-lab sh -c 'cat /proc/device-tree/model; ls /dev/i2c* /dev/gpiochip* /dev/kvm /dev/vcio'

Real output:

cat: /proc/device-tree/model: No such file or directory
ls: cannot access '/dev/i2c*': No such file or directory
ls: cannot access '/dev/gpiochip*': No such file or directory
ls: cannot access '/dev/kvm': No such file or directory
ls: cannot access '/dev/vcio': No such file or directory
On the Pi In the sandbox
/dev/i2c-* (displays, sensors) Absent
/dev/gpiochip* (GPIO pins) Absent
/dev/kvm Absent

The trade-off

Code in this sandbox can't drive an OLED, a fan, or a sensor. Let the agent write hardware code in the workspace, review it, then run it on the Pi yourself.

What isn't protected

The workspace is mounted read-write. An agent can change or delete anything in it, so keep secrets out and use Git.