Prove the Isolation
An agent on your Pi could reach your SSH keys, and also the hardware wired to the GPIO header. Check that the sandbox can reach neither.
Your home directory
sbx exec pi-lab ls -la $HOME
sbx exec pi-lab ls $HOME/.ssh $HOME/.claude
Real output:
drwxr-xr-t 3 root root 4096 Nov 22 10:52 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Nov 22 10:52 ..
drwxr-xr-t 4 agent agent 4096 Nov 22 10:52 Projects
ls: cannot access '/home/ajeetraina/.ssh': No such file or directory
ls: cannot access '/home/ajeetraina/.claude': No such file or directory
The path exists only to hold the workspace mount. Nothing else from your home is there.
The user
sbx exec pi-lab id
Real output:
uid=1000(agent) gid=1000(agent) groups=1000(agent),27(sudo),999(docker)
The agent can be powerful inside its VM without being you on the Pi.
Pi hardware
sbx exec pi-lab sh -c 'cat /proc/device-tree/model; ls /dev/i2c* /dev/gpiochip* /dev/kvm /dev/vcio'
Real output:
cat: /proc/device-tree/model: No such file or directory
ls: cannot access '/dev/i2c*': No such file or directory
ls: cannot access '/dev/gpiochip*': No such file or directory
ls: cannot access '/dev/kvm': No such file or directory
ls: cannot access '/dev/vcio': No such file or directory
| On the Pi | In the sandbox |
|---|---|
/dev/i2c-* (displays, sensors) |
Absent |
/dev/gpiochip* (GPIO pins) |
Absent |
/dev/kvm |
Absent |
The trade-off
Code in this sandbox can't drive an OLED, a fan, or a sensor. Let the agent write hardware code in the workspace, review it, then run it on the Pi yourself.
What isn't protected
The workspace is mounted read-write. An agent can change or delete anything in it, so keep secrets out and use Git.